CVE-2025-22030

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: zswap: fix crypto_free_acomp() deadlock in zswap_cpu_comp_dead() Currently, zswap_cpu_comp_dead() calls crypto_free_acomp() while holding the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. crypto_free_acomp() then holds scomp_lock (through crypto_exit_scomp_ops_async()). On the other hand, crypto_alloc_acomp_node() holds the scomp_lock (through crypto_scomp_init_tfm()), and then allocates memory. If the allocation results in reclaim, we may attempt to hold the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex. The above dependencies can cause an ABBA deadlock. For example in the following scenario: (1) Task A running on CPU #1: crypto_alloc_acomp_node() Holds scomp_lock Enters reclaim Reads per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) (2) Task A is descheduled (3) CPU #1 goes offline zswap_cpu_comp_dead(CPU #1) Holds per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1)) Calls crypto_free_acomp() Waits for scomp_lock (4) Task A running on CPU #2: Waits for per_cpu_ptr(pool->acomp_ctx, 1) // Read on CPU #1 DEADLOCK Since there is no requirement to call crypto_free_acomp() with the per-CPU acomp_ctx mutex held in zswap_cpu_comp_dead(), move it after the mutex is unlocked. Also move the acomp_request_free() and kfree() calls for consistency and to avoid any potential sublte locking dependencies in the future. With this, only setting acomp_ctx fields to NULL occurs with the mutex held. This is similar to how zswap_cpu_comp_prepare() only initializes acomp_ctx fields with the mutex held, after performing all allocations before holding the mutex. Opportunistically, move the NULL check on acomp_ctx so that it takes place before the mutex dereference.

Predictions

Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.

Mitigations

References

• https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-22030.html
• https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-22030