CVE-2026-31707
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. Three cases can overflow: KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) + resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed. This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request side.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
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OS impact
| OS | Version | Status | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| sles | affected | | |
| debian | bookworm | affected | |
| debian | bullseye | fixed | 0 |
| debian | forky | fixed | 7.0.3-1 |
| debian | sid | fixed | 7.0.3-1 |
| debian | trixie | fixed | 6.12.85-1 |
| linux-kernel | affected | 6.12.84 | |
| windows | affected | |
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/299db777ea0cfa5c407e41b045c24a14c034c27b
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd0c858e1909769a4c91842724315ee74f1a5f1
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99c631d0366c1eab8fb188fe66425f4581ebdde4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf396208418371174869baba9434535cd3288e80
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6a6aa81eac2c9bff66dc6e191179cb69a14426b
- https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-31707.html
- https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-31707
- https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-31707
CWEs
CWE-787
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.