CVE-2026-6720
Description
When calicoctl is invoked with --log-level=info or --log-level=debug, the client prints the full contents of its loaded connection-configuration struct to stderr in a single log line. The struct embeds every credential calicoctl uses to talk to the cluster โ inline kubeconfig (with bearer token), Kubernetes API bearer token, etcd password, and inline PEM-encoded etcd client certificate and key. Any reader of that stderr stream โ CI job logs, session-recording archives, shared support-ticket transcripts, or local filesystem viewers on the host that ran calicoctl โ can extract these credentials with zero Kubernetes privilege. calicoctl's default log level is panic, so this issue only triggers when verbose logging is explicitly enabled.
Predictions
Heuristic predictions, AS-IS, for prioritization only.
Mitigations
No mitigations published for this CVE yet.
The vendor-content worker queues fetches as references arrive (check back in a few minutes). Or โ if you've already worked around this in production โ publish your fix to the community-verified tier.
โ Propose a mitigation on Community โ Mitigations published via the community go through AI scoring + 2 human reviewers + 7-day silent objection window before landing here withsource_tier=community-verified.
References
CWEs
CWE-532
Community-verified mitigations for this CVE will appear above when contributors publish them.
Verify integrity in audit chain (admin only). AS-IS.